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INTRODUCTION
How should the federal government encourage innovation in the United
States? Policymakers have a menu of choices at their disposal. They can give
cash grants, issue patents, offer prizes, or provide tax breaks. But when legal
scholars set about answering the question, they tend to focus on their areas of
expertise. Intellectual property scholars typically talk about patent scope or
duration, the doctrine of equivalents, and disclosure requirements.' Tax
scholars argue that research tax credits should be larger, permanent, or more
easily accessible.! Sometimes these scholars acknowledge that their chosen
institution should treat different technologies or industries differently.' But
how to deploy an institution -patent, tax, or spending-to encourage
innovation should be the second question we ask. The initial, oft-overlooked'
1. A survey of all the patent-focused innovation literature would be impossible. Here I focus
on recent, prominent examples where institutional alternatives could have been promising
but were largely or completely ignored. E.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for
Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REv. 803 (2007); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does
Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1404
(2009) (proposing patent law tailoring); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (2001); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming
Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation,
and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123 (20o6); Richard A. Posner, Patent Trolls Be
Gone: How to Fix Our Broken System for Stimulating Invention, SLATE (Oct. 15, 2012, 5:16
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/view-from-chicago/202/io/patent
protection how to fix it.html.
2. E.g., Robert D. Atkinson, Expanding the R&E Tax Credit to Drive Innovation, Competitiveness
and Prosperity, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 617 (2007); Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalize Costs of
Software Development, 124 TAx NOTES 603 (2009); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for
Research and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEo. L.J. 347 (1987); Evan
Wamsley, Note, The Definition of Qualified Research Under the Section 41 Research and
Development Tax Credit: Its Impact on the Credit's Effectiveness, 87 VA. L. REv. 165 (2001).
3. E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1581-89, 1675-96; Carroll, supra note i, at 1395-96;
Posner, supra note 1.
4. Three exceptions to this trend are worth noting. The first is an article by Brett Frischmann,
Innovations and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24
VT. L. REV. 347 (2000). In his article, Professor Frischmann begins with the same theme as
in this Note: that we should engage in institutional comparisons when evaluating
innovation policy. He describes the institution of tax at some length. Id. at 382-85. But
Professor Frischmann does not explore the innovation environments in which tax is
preferable to patent; his in-depth example focuses on a mix of grants and intellectual
property. Id. at 395-413.
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question is the following: which institution (or mix of institutions) should we
use in the first place?
This oversight is surprising for the simple reason that the stakes are so
high. Federal research and development tax incentives total more than $10
billion annually;s the rents that patent holders collect are hard to estimate, but
they probably top $30 billion every year;6 and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) alone distributed over $30 billion for medical research in 2012.7 These
cash and cash-equivalent distributions -which drive much of the research that
fuels the U.S. economy-often have overlapping targets. Yet the subsidies
themselves, the way they are allocated, and the institutions that distribute them
are substantially different. These differences should inform our choice of how
to encourage innovation.
To illustrate, consider the emerging technology of DNA computing.8 There
The second exception is the economics literature, which has given significant thought
to comparing patents to prizes. E.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual
Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51
(Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002) (reviewing the justifications for
intellectual property and the case for prizes); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele,
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (arguing for an
optional patent-prize hybrid system); E. Glen Weyl & Jean Tirole, Market Power Screens
Willingness-to-Pay, 127 QJ. ECON. 1971 (2012) (modeling the optimal combination of patents
and prizes).
Third, a forthcoming work by Daniel Hemel and Lisa Ouellette explores the interplay
between patents, prizes, tax credits, and grants. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2245691. They argue that each of these institutions can theoretically
achieve similar results. Id. (manuscript at 8). They go on to establish a three-part framework
for characterizing innovation subsidies: who decides the size of the reward, when the reward
will be provided, and who pays for the reward. Id. (manuscript at 19). While we reach some
different conclusions, compare id. (manuscript at 4) (disfavoring tax credits for technology
fields populated by startups), with infra Sections II.C, II.D (arguing for the use of tax credits
in emerging technology fields), their descriptive model tends to support the suggestions I
put forward in this Note.
5. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017, at 30 tbl.i (Joint Comm. Print 2013).
6. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 114 (2008). This estimate is actually based on
inflation-adjusted data from 1999. Id.
7. NIH Budget, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nih.gov/about
/budget.htm.
8. See generally David I. Lewin, DNA Computing, COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING, May/June
2002, at 5 (providing an introduction to DNA computing); DNA Computing: Computing
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are several potential advantages to using DNA to store data and conduct
computations. 9 The research is still mostly of the basic variety, although
commercial entities have started to show some interest."o How should the
government encourage this nascent research as it becomes commercially viable?
One of the arguments that I will make in this Note is that the patent system
may be a poor fit for such a field. For instance, the patentability of a DNA
computer-and the computer's related interactions with human cells-seems
presently uncertain.1 The eventual patentability determinations will lag the
technology by decades and will not necessarily be motivated by sound policy
rationales." Moreover, the patent system might underfund such early-stage
research, as many of the developments -while critical to charting the field-
will not themselves yield any commercially viable products. This decreases the
with Soup, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21548488
(describing the history of the field).
9. The original proof-of-concept experiment from 1994 demonstrated that DNA computing
could be faster and more energy efficient than existing supercomputers. Leonard M.
Adleman, Molecular Computation of Solutions to Combinatorial Problems, 266 SCIENCE 1021,
1023 (1994). DNA can also store more information per unit of space than any extant hard
drive system. See George M. Church, Yuan Gao & Sriram Kosuri, Next-Generation Digital
Information Storage in DNA, 337 SCIENCE 1628 (2012); Nick Goldman et al., Towards
Practical, High-Capacity, Low-Maintenance Information Storage in Synthesized DNA, 494
NATURE 77 (2013). Perhaps most importantly, DNA computers can operate within human
cells, and thus could yield significant medical benefits. See DNA Computing: Computing with
Soup, supra note 8.
1o. Microsoft is hiring. See Research Opportunities in Biological Computation, MICROSOFT RES.
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/groups/biology/jobs.aspx. Quantum
computing, DNA computing's more famous cousin, is a bit further down the
commercialization path. See Cade Metz, Google's Quantum Computer Proven to Be Real Thing
(Almost), WIRED (June 28, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise
/2013/o6/d-wave-quantum-computer-usc.
ii. The recent Supreme Court decision on the topic makes it more likely that synthetic, non-
naturally occurring DNA constructions would be patentable. See Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). But DNA computing would likely
challenge this synthetic/natural binary, as it usually involves interactions between artificial
networks and natural processes. See, e.g., Zhen Xie et al., Multi-Input RNAi-Based Logic
Circuit for Identification of Specific Cancer Cells, 333 SCIENCE 1307 (2011) (describing a
synthetic genetic circuit that could discriminate cancerous from non-cancerous cells by
measuring intracellular microRNA concentrations and could trigger natural cell death
in cancerous cells); see also Biological 'Computer' Destroys Cancer Cells: Diagnostic Network
Incorporated into Human Cells, SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.sciencedaily
.com/releases/2o11/o9/11o901142os6.htm (summarizing the research).
12. See infra Section II.D.
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value of patenting such discoveries." Other subsidy systems are not so limited;
research tax credits, for example, are distributed ex ante regardless of
commercial success. Moreover, the institution overseeing the tax system has
the data-gathering tools to make informed decisions about qualifying research.
As will be discussed throughout this Note, these advantages recommend using
the tax system to fund emerging technologies like DNA computing.
The thesis of this Note is that tax may be a more effective driver of
innovation than previously recognized. But my suggestion is not an across-the-
board increase in tax credits. Rather, I will recommend that Congress should
reallocate the $10 billion in annual research tax expenditures to more narrowly
target those domains where tax is most effective. To get to this conclusion, I
will compare the institutions of patent and tax, and argue that the strengths of
tax complement the weaknesses of the patent system. My suggestion is that
Congress should focus its tax expenditures on those areas of research where
patents fail and tax excels.
While my analysis will hopefully demonstrate the value in a comparative
institutional analysis, I admit that I am not taking on the choice-of-institution
question in its entirety. I am focusing on tax's strengths relative to patents -
and largely ignoring grants and prizes-for a variety of reasons. First, patent
and tax are the two institutions primarily focused on encouraging commercial
research. Grants fill a different niche, as they tend to be directed at basic,
university investigations. Second, neither patent nor tax requires that
government officials decide ex ante whether or not any particular research
qualifies for the subsidy. Federal grant programs involve scientist-officials
approving promising research before it takes place. Traditional prizes require
some upfront goal specifications. There are plausible arguments that this style
of top-down directed research is inefficient." Third, the case for prizes, in
particular, has already been made." Notwithstanding these cogent arguments,
the federal government has shown little inclination to convert to a prize-
oriented system of innovation subsidies." By contrast, the government is
extremely comfortable distributing tax subsidies to promote favored types of
research. Thus, by focusing on tax, I hope to make a series of suggestions that
might actually be implemented by the federal government. Finally, as I hope
13. See infra Section II.C.
14. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
1s. E.g., Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 4; Weyl & Tirole, supra note 4.
16. For a discussion of the recent public and private attempts to use prizes, see Hemel &
Ouellette, supra note 4 (manuscript at 11-13).
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to show in this Note, patent and tax are complementary in many respects.
Comparing these institutions illustrates their advantages and limitations. I
leave for another day the question of whether prizes and grants have
similar strengths and weaknesses and how they could be added to the
institutional mix.
Part I of this Note lays the groundwork necessary for my argument: first,
by explaining the economic logic for government subsidies to innovation; and
second, by describing how patent and tax affect social welfare by encouraging
more optimal research decisionmaking.
Part II analyzes several specific advantages of tax subsidies relative to the
patent system. Along with exploring tax's comparative benefits, I describe the
innovation environments in which these advantages are particularly important.
I identify four considerations that should inform a choice between patent and
tax when the government's goal is to foster socially beneficial research
decisions. (Table 1 offers a summary.) The first important difference between
tax and patent is tax's relatively low administrative cost. When inventors are
filing low-value or multiple patents, these lower administrative costs will make
tax comparatively efficient in encouraging innovation. The second difference is
subsidy timing. In situations where credit markets are imperfect, tax's upfront
payments ease the burden of research costs, which is particularly valuable for
small inventors. The third difference is tax's reward for risk taking. When
failure is valuable, tax may be preferable. The fourth and final point is
institutional: tax's rewards are more flexible and immediate, while patent is
perhaps more predictable over a longer time frame. These differences favor tax
in situations of technological change and emerging industries. Implementing
the changes that flow from these observations could dramatically improve the
productivity of hitherto neglected research environments while simultaneously
cutting the costs of duplicative subsidies.
Table 1.
FOUR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATENT AND TAX
Tax Patent
Cost to Administer Low High
Subsidy Timing Ex ante Ex post
Rewards for Risk Taking Subsidizes Subsidizes success
experimentation
Institutional Character Flexible Stable
818
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1. INNOVATION SUBSIDIES AND SOCIAL WELFARE
A. Why Subsidize Research?
Innovations are slippery things. Sometimes they come unexpectedly and
effortlessly, like a bolt in the night. But other times they are the product of
systematic, careful investigation. This Note is concerned with how government
policymakers should best stimulate such research-driven innovations. But first
we must ask the prior question: why should we be encouraging research at all?
Even in a world without any government help, entrepreneurs would still
investigate new technologies." Indeed, many of the most important inventions
in history have sprung forth without much or any meddling from the
government.' Nevertheless, there are good arguments in favor of subsidizing
research. Perhaps the best reason is that research can produce spillover
benefits -positive externalities benefiting someone other than the inventor."
These are benefits that the researcher herself cannot appropriate. Consider, for
example, Ford Motor Company's development of the moving assembly line in
the early twentieth century. To be sure, Ford made a handsome profit from
this innovation - it was able to make cars much more cheaply. However, the
value of this innovation far exceeded the value to Ford Motor Company alone.
Other manufacturers soon imitated Ford's improved process, which allowed
them to also use their capital and labor more efficiently.2 o In the parlance of
innovation theory, we can say that Ford was unable to appropriate the full
value of its innovation.
As a general rule, individuals will engage in research when the research's
expected value - to the inventor - is greater than the research's costs. But when
researchers cannot appropriate the full value of their innovations, those
17. Inventors are able to profit from their discoveries even absent patent protection via
mechanisms like trade secret, first-mover advantages, branding, and market barriers. See
Frischmann, supra note 4, at 367-70; Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from
Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 794
(1987).
18. See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 52-
67 (2o8).
ig. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258-61 (2007).
2o. DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION, 1800-1932, at ii
(1984).
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innovations may be underproduced.2 ' This is a critical point that motivates
most government expenditure on research. Imagine that an executive at Ford is
deciding whether to spend money researching an assembly line. She estimates
that the company could undertake a project costing $1oo,ooo that would yield
a 50% probability of producing a productivity-enhancing process that could
earn the company $150,ooo. As a profit maximizer, she will reject this research
plan because it yields an expected loss of $25,000. But what if the research, if
successful, would also earn Ford's competitors $15o,ooo worth of productivity
enhancements? Then, society's expected value from the research would total
$150,000. Since that is more than the $ioo,ooo cost of the research, society
would prefer that Ford undertake the research. For the purposes of this Note, I
will assume that research decisionmaking is "optimal" when inventors
engage in research whenever the total research costs are less than or equal to
the expected total social welfare produced by the research. The reason
we subsidize research is to bridge the gap between an individual inventor's
expected value and society's expected value: in the example above, society
should be willing to spend up to $75,000 to encourage Ford to undertake
the research.
There are many ways society could encourage Ford to engage in more
optimal decisionmaking. The Constitution puts forward one solution in the
Patent and Copyright Clause,2 and patents do present an elegant way of
allowing Ford to appropriate much of the value of the assembly line. But
Congress could also rebate some portion of Ford's research costs - this is the
basic approach of Congress's research tax credit. Congress could also fund the
research directly-this is the approach embodied in, for example, NIH grants
to private researchers. Or Congress could award a prize to the first team to
develop an assembly line. The basic point is this: there is an institutional choice
21. Of course, full appropriability may also overcompensate researchers where they would have
undertaken their research for less. This adds to the deadweight cost of government
subsidies, but it does not remove the possibility that natural market mechanisms will fail to
bring about some social-welfare-enhancing lines of research.
22. I acknowledge that a system that achieves this "optimal" state will be inefficient in other
ways -for example, by overcompensating some researchers or by imposing distortions that
outweigh the marginal social benefits of the extra subsidies.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Of course, patents do not involve direct expenditures, but
rather impose an indirect cost on society via higher prices of patented products. The patent
system essentially gives Ford a 50% chance at an extra $15o,ooo, which is equivalent to an ex
ante subsidy of $75,000.
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Congress has to make about how best to encourage innovation.' A full
comparison of all these alternatives is desirable but beyond the scope of this
Note. Here I focus on a pairing that has been largely overlooked in the
innovation literature": patent protection and the research tax credit. I will
argue that various features of the patent and tax systems make tax particularly
attractive under certain innovation conditions. We shall see that tax may be the
most sensible legal vehicle for encouraging innovation when the research
produces many inventions, has a long commercialization period, or is in an
emerging field. Tax may also be the preferred approach for helping
lone inventors and small businesses, or when the industry is diffuse and
difficult to monitor.
B. Patents
The patent system attempts to spur innovation by granting researchers a
right to exclude others from using their invention, which provides the
researchers with a temporary monopoly on their discoveries." With this
monopoly, a researcher can earn a "patent subsidy" by charging more for
products that use the invention or by licensing the invention to her
competitors." In effect, society is subsidizing the invention by way of higher
prices. To be patentable, an invention must be novel, useful, and non-
obvious. 8 It must also be a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter. 9 A patent holder can sue infringers3 o to enjoin their use and to recover
damages." The great benefit of the patent system is that it more closely aligns
an inventor's expected value in doing research with society's total expected
24. For a more formal exploration of the optimal funding levels under these different regimes,
see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4 (manuscript at 23-25).
25. See supra notes 1-2.
26. The current patent term is twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
27. For an excellent discussion of the economic fundamentals of intellectual property and
patents, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REv. 989, 993-99 (1997).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility); id. 5 102 (novelty); id. 5 103 (non-obviousness).
29. Id. § 101 (patentable categories).
30. Id. 5 271 ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention ... infringes the patent.").
31. Id. §§ 283-284.
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value from that research.3 ' Harkening back to the example in the previous
Section, a patent would allow Ford to charge its competitors to use the
assembly line. In a perfect market, Ford would earn an extra $150,000, which
would equalize Ford's expected value and the expected value to society. The
patent system succeeds in aligning social welfare with research incentives when
socially valuable ideas -with patent protection -command large profits or high
licensing fees. To be sure, patent does not operate to maximize social welfare in
all cases: some discoveries, like surgical checklists, are notoriously hard to
monetize even with patent protection, and these goods will be systematically
underproduced without other subsidies." Nevertheless, the patent system does
succeed at providing significant subsidies for inventions of large social value
that would otherwise be underproduced.
In exchange for these handsome rewards, the patent system demands a
quid pro quo*: inventors seeking patents must disclose their invention
publicly.3 s Disclosure ensures that the invention can be easily reduced to
practice by the public at the end of the patent term.
A final notable feature of the patent system is that it harnesses the
inventor's own knowledge about the value of the research. 6 Government
regulators do not need to vet the project ahead of time. Rather, the inventor
decides what she thinks will be the most profitable course of research. This is
an advantage because we assume that researchers are best situated to evaluate
the probability of success and the commercial viability of their research agenda.
By exploiting this privately held knowledge, the patent system avoids the costly
and duplicative bureaucracy of direct government funding.
Through the mechanisms described above, the patent system aims to
improve social welfare by producing innovations that would not otherwise
have come about. However, the patent system also involves several drawbacks.
It imposes deadweight loss via monopoly pricing: some consumers who would
32. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
276-79 (1977).
33. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum ofExcludability and the Limits of Patent, 122
YALE L.J. 1900, 1937-41 (2013). Professors Kapczynski and Syed further argue that the patent
system exacerbates this under-provision since it allocates scarce resources to the most
excludable information goods. Id. at 1915.
34. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) ("[I]mmediate disclosure . . . is exacted from
... the patentee. It is the price paid for the exclusivity secured.").
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)(A), 112.
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be willing to pay the competitive price of a good (i.e., the price without any
patent protection) will not buy at the monopoly price; this missed exchange is
a social welfare loss." Additionally, patents can hinder innovation by other
researchers, who will have to pay licensing fees and may be excluded altogether
from using patented ideas to further their own research." Because of these
substantial costs-which are incurred even for inventions that would have
emerged without patent - policymakers should only seek to distribute patent
protection to the extent necessary to optimally stimulate research.
Two additional details are worth noting. First, implementing the patent
system has administrative costs, which include filing fees and enforcement
costs, among others. This is an oft-overlooked impediment to patent law
achieving optimal efficiency to which we'll return in Section II.A. Second, the
patent system only operates on successful inventions. Patent does not allow
any appropriation of experimental failures that benefit society. I will address
this distortion in Section II.C.
C. Tax
The federal government also uses tax incentives to improve social welfare
by stimulating research. These incentives reduce researchers' tax bills
proportionally to the amount they spend on qualified research. The intricacies
of how these tax incentives are calculated are somewhat complex and not
critical to my argument in this Note. Here I merely provide an overview."
The two major federal tax incentives for research are a tax deduction 4o and
a tax credit.4 ' The research tax deduction allows taxpayers to treat research or
experimental costs related to a trade or business as a current expense.4' Thus, if
37. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 4, at 529.
38. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2000).
39. For an extremely helpful and extensive discussion of the research incentives in the federal
tax code, see generally MICHAEL D. RASHKIN, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TAX
INCENTIVES: FEDERAL, STATE, AND FOREIGN (2003).
4o. I.R.C. § 174 (2012).
41. Id. § 41.
42. Id. § 174(a)(1). Typically, expenditures providing benefits for more than a year (as research
expenditures do) would need to be capitalized and would not be immediately deductible
from income. Treating research expenditures as a current expense provides taxpayers with a
823
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Ford spends $100,000 on research in 2013, it can immediately reduce its net
income by $ioo,ooo, which, if Ford has a marginal tax rate of 35%, would
reduce its tax bill by $35,ooo. The most significant restriction on the deduction
is that it must be for expenditures that are "research and development costs in
the experimental or laboratory sense," which has been further interpreted to
mean costs related to scientific research and analysis that is intended
to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding the development of an innovative
product.4 1
The second major federal tax subsidy for research is the research credit.
Congress enacted this credit in 1981,44 a time when U.S. research expenditures
were decreasing when measured against the growth of the broader U.S.
economy.4s The credit equals twenty percent of the increase in a taxpayer's
qualified research expenses for the taxable year over a base amount.46 The base
amount is the product of a fixed-base percentage-the percentage of the
taxpayer's total gross receipts spent on qualified research averaged over a set
period during the 198os-and the average annual gross receipts in the prior
four taxable years. So if Ford's gross income remains the same and it spends
$100,000 more on research in 2013 than it had in the previous four years, the
amount of taxes it owes would be decreased by $20,000.48
Research expenses that qualify for the tax credit include wages paid to an
employee engaged in qualified research as well as the expenses for supplies
used in that research. 49 For the research to qualify for the credit, it must meet
three criteria beyond the requirements for the deduction. First, the research
must be undertaken for the "purpose of discovering information . .. which is
technological in nature."so Second, the research activities must "constitute
major benefit. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 295-301 (6th ed. 2009).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (2012).
44. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
45. RASHKIN, supra note 39, 315.
46. I.R.C. § 41(a). Section 41 also subsidizes other activities, such as basic research and energy
research expenditures; these subsidies are not considered in this Note.
47. Id- § 41(c).
48. A company that claims the research tax credit must reduce their research deduction by the
credit amount. Id. § 280C(c)(1). So in this example, Ford would need to reduce the
deduction from $oo,ooo to $80,ooo.
49. Id. § 4 1(b)(2)(A).
so. Id. § 41(d)(i)(B).
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elements of a process of experimentation."" Third, the research must be
intended to improve the function, performance, quality, or reliability of a
business component.s2 A "business component" is defined as a "product,
process, computer software, technique, formula, or invention which is to be
held for sale, lease, or license, or used by the taxpayer in a trade or business of
the taxpayer."" These determinations are made by the taxpayer herself-she
does not need to have the research approved in advance to claim the credit (or
deduction), although she will have to provide sufficient documentation should
she be audited.s4
The scope of these research tax subsidies is larger than the scope of patent
protection. IRS regulations have established a patent safe harbor: the issuance
of a patent is "conclusive evidence that a taxpayer has discovered information
that is technological in nature that is intended to eliminate uncertainty
concerning the development or improvement of a business component."ss This
safe harbor does not cover every element of the three-part test described
above." Thus, there may be a small class of inventions that can be patented but
whose research expenditures would not qualify for the tax subsidies. For
instance, one might imagine patentable inventions that wouldn't qualify as a
business component because they will not be used in the taxpayer's trade or
business. However, these will be unusual instances,' and perhaps they are not
the sort of discoveries that need to be subsidized at all. On the other hand,
huge swaths of non-patentable research qualify for tax subsidies in any case.
The IRS has noted that a patent is not a prerequisite for claiming the research
tax credit.s8 Of particular note, research need not be a success to qualify for the
51. Id. § 41(d)(i)(C).
52. Id. § 41(d)(1)(B)(ii).
s3. Id. § 41(d)(2)(B).
54. See RASHKIN, supra note 39, 801-15 (discussing the documentation requirements and
audit procedures for the research tax credit).
ss. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(3)(iii) (2012).
56. See RASHKIN, supra note 39, 44o.o (noting that the patent safe harbor only applies to the
discovery requirement).
57. See id. (arguing that practically any inventor whose invention qualifies for a non-design
patent will also have engaged in qualified research for the purposes of the research tax
credit).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(3)(iii)-
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credit; moreover, the taxpayer need not be the first to make a discovery for the
research to qualify.5 9
Much like the patent system, tax aims to improve social welfare by
producing innovations that would not otherwise have been discovered. Instead
of increasing appropriability directly, the tax system provides a cash rebate to
the researcher by decreasing her tax bill. Ideally, this credit would equal the
difference between the expected value of the research to the inventor and the
expected value of the research to society. An important feature of tax -which is
both a weakness and a strength - is that the size of the credit is easy to
manipulate. This is a weakness because it creates the possibility a researcher
could receive an inefficiently large or small credit. But it is a strength because it
allows policymakers to tailor the tax credit to accommodate differences in
innovation environments.
However, distributing research credits6o also has a social cost. The social
welfare cost of the tax credit depends on the nature of the tax that is used to
collect funds to pay for the credit. Highly distortionary taxes will impose
greater social costs,6 ' and the larger the distributed credits, the greater those
costs."2 Thus, much like for patent, we should only aim to distribute research
tax credits to the extent that they are most likely to produce social welfare-
improving research.
II. AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON
As the preceding Part suggests, patent and tax can both contribute to social
welfare by encouraging innovation. But the two regimes are strikingly
different. In this Part, I explore four important differences: administrative
s. Credit for Increasing Research Activities, T.D. 8930, 66 Fed. Reg. 280-01 (Jan. 3, 2001)
("The clarifications that the credit may be available where the technological advance sought
is evolutionary, where the taxpayer is not the first to achieve the advance, and where the
taxpayer fails to achieve the intended advance have been incorporated elsewhere in the
regulations.").
6o. For the purposes of this Note, I will refer mainly to the research tax credit, but most of the
logic can be applied similarly to the research tax deduction.
61. The distortionary effects of, for example, income taxation will largely turn on the elasticity
of the labor supply being taxed. See Greg Mankiw, How Distortionary Are Taxes?, GREG
MANw's BLOG (NOV. 27, 2006), http://gregmankiw.blogspot.conV2oo6/11/how
-distortionary-are-taxes.html.
62. For an interesting discussion of who should bear the cost of research subsidies, see Hemel &
Ouellette, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39-45).
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costs, subsidy timing, rewards for risk taking, and institutional character.
These differences suggest that we could more optimally encourage innovation
by reconfiguring the patent/tax balance of the status quo. Deploying stronger
tax subsidies for innovation in a few particular research environments would
yield better research decisions at low additional costs.
A. Administrative Costs
Administrative costs are costs borne by the inventor that are not related to
actually doing the research. These are costs that only come about from the
inventor trying to obtain the subsidy. The paradigmatic administrative cost is
hiring a lawyer to write a patent application or an accountant to prepare a tax
return. Other administrative costs include filing fees and litigation costs
associated with defending the patent or tax return. Administrative costs are
problematic because they deter socially desirable research that would otherwise
be undertaken. This occurs when the expected value of the research is greater
than the research's costs-perhaps in part because of a government subsidy-
but the administrative costs incurred in obtaining the subsidy flip this
relationship such that total costs exceed expected value.
Both the patent and tax systems include many such costs. But in this
Section I will argue that the expenses of filing and defending patents impose
burdens on certain types of research that tax subsidies largely avoid. In
particular, all else being equal, tax has a comparative advantage in subsidizing
research that (1) yields many small inventions, (2) produces innovations that
are costly to exclude competitors from using, or (3) has a low expected value. I
will argue that we could promote more optimal research decisionmaking by
using stronger tax credits for these research environments. Additionally, I will
argue that the tax system is amenable to having its administrative costs reduced
if policymakers see fit, which make it a strong choice in any domain where we
think such costs are problematic.
1. Administrative Costs ofPatent
There are, broadly, two sorts of administrative costs involved in using the
patent system: prosecution costs and enforcement costs. Patent prosecution
comprises the legal steps involved in initially obtaining the right to exclude.
Typically this involves a lawyer searching for similar inventions that would
invalidate the potential patent, a lawyer drafting the initial patent application
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to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and responding to subsequent PTO
actions, and the patentee paying the PTO's filing fees. It can also involve
appellate review6 1 and, with the passage of the America Invents Act, various
forms of administrative litigation after the grant of the patent.' And, of
course, the patentee often needs to secure patent protection in many other
countries - there is no such thing as an international patent.6 s
Prosecuting patents is expensive. Collecting figures from several studies,
Mark Lemley estimates that it costs between $io,ooo and $30,000 to prosecute
a patent in the United States from start to finish (where "finish" means patent
issuance). And these costs have little chance of decreasing. Indeed, most
commentators argue that the PTO-which is notoriously slow and inaccurate
in issuing patents - needs more funding, which would likely mean higher filing
fees." The current filing fee structure does give a fifty percent discount to
small entities. 68 And the new America Invents Act-although it raises fees
across the board by fifteen percent69 -gives a further discount to "micro
entities."7 o But these fee reductions do not diminish the impact of attorney
63. A patent applicant may appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board after being twice
rejected by a patent examiner. 35 U.S.C § 134(a) (20o6).
64. For instance, third parties may challenge an issued patent in a procedure called "post-grant
review" within nine months of issuance on any invalidity grounds. Id. § 321.
65. There is, however, a patent cooperation treaty that facilitates the initial filing and prior art
search for 148 member countries. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645,
116o U.N.T.S. 231, http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf; PCT Resources, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/pct/en (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). However, this
process is itself quite expensive, with cost estimates in the ballpark of $250,000. And the
patent applicant must follow up a successful international application in each nation's own
patent system. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-o3-91o, EXPERTS' ADVICE FOR SMAIL
BUsINESSEs SEEKING FOREIGN PATENTS 42-43 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items
/do391o.pdf.
66. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498 & n.13
(2001).
67. See id. at 1495 n.i, 15o8 nn.56-57.
68. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 5 ii(d), 125 Stat. 284, 323 (2011) (to
be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 4 1(h)). Small entities are businesses with fewer than 500
employees. 13 C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (2012).
6g. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 11(i), 125 Stat. at 325.
70. Id. § 10, 125 Stat. at 316-17. Micro entities must be small entities and must be inventors on
fewer than four previously filed patent applications. Among other requirements, they also
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fees.71 And even for small firms with simple patents, preparation costs are the
lion's share of patent prosecution expenses.72
For a patent to have any value, though, it must be enforced. Patents give
the patentee the right to sue infringers. Patent enforcement consists of the
myriad activities after patent issuance that are required to maintain monopoly
rights. These activities require payments including monitoring costs, which the
patentee uses to stay abreast of both the public and private uses of her patented
technology; negotiation costs, if the patentee wishes to license out her
technology; litigation costs, should the patentee detect infringement; and PTO
maintenance fees.
Estimates for the cost of patent enforcement are harder to come by since it
is discretionary-that is, patent holders may choose to enforce their property
rights a lot or not at all. Commentators rightly assume that these enforcement
costs are high, though. Costs related to monitoring vary based on industry
size and composition. In industries with a few big players, or industries where
sales and production are highly regulated, patent infringement should be fairly
easy to observe. The canonical example is the pharmaceutical industry-
because of the extensive monitoring by the FDA and the requirement for
publicized studies validating treatments, a company like Merck would not need
to spend much to find out if Pfizer is infringing one of its patents. On the other
hand, in a diffuse industry such as computer programming, detecting patent
infringement might require expensive investigation and constant vigilance.
While monitoring costs are significant but amorphous, litigation costs are
simply significant. Very few patents ever get litigated after issuance,' but the
ones that do cost about $8oo,ooo to take through discovery and $1.5 million to
71. See, e.g., Hearing on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, ioth Cong. io8 (2008)
(statement of Alan J. Kasper, First Vice President, American Intellectual Law Association)
(estimating that the preparation of a simple patent application by his firm would cost $8,548
and that the preparation of a "relatively complex biotechnology/chemical" patent by such a
firm would cost $15,398). At the time of Kasper's testimony, the filing fees for such an
application were a little over $i,ooo. Id.
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 53, 5 (2011) ("The costliness of enforcement may thus lead both users and
owners to ignore patents in many situations.").
74. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1501.
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take through trial and appeal.7 1 Any patentee wishing to credibly threaten a
patent infringement lawsuit must be ready to shoulder this burden.
These administrative costs are all multiplied if the patentee wants
international protection. Monitoring is obviously more expensive when
infringement can be occurring across the globe. International patent litigation
is increasingly common and incredibly expensive, as evidenced by the Apple-
Samsung litigation over the design of those companies' smartphones, which, as
of 2011, spanned nine countries.'6 And prosecuting patents internationally is
very expensive: the GAO has estimated that patenting in nine countries could
cost up to $33o,ooo.77
2. Administrative Costs of Tax
The administrative costs of tax are rather different. These costs are more
accurately thought of as compliance costs -expenses for recordkeeping, filling
out tax forms, and the like. The best evidence about compliance costs for
research tax credits actually comes from surveys of Canadian companies.
These surveys asked the companies how much they spent on research, how
large a credit they received, and how much they spent on complying with the
tax requirements. They found that compliance costs for the Canadian
"scientific research and experimental development credit" were low overall but
varied quite a lot based on the size of the firm. For instance, estimates of
annual compliance costs have ranged between 0.7%79 and 14.5%8o of the total
75. Id. at 1502.
76. Chloe Albanesius, Every Place Samsung and Apple Are Suing Each Other, PC MAG. (Sept. 14,
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/o,2817,2392920,oo.asp.
77. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 65, at 40-41.
78. Sally Gunz, Alan Macnaughton & Karen Wensley, Measuring the Compliance Cost of Tax
Expenditures: The Case of Research and Development Incentives, 43 CAN. TAx J. 2008 (1995);
Secretariat to the Review of Fed. Support to Research & Dev. Expert Panel, Assessing the
Scientific Research and Experimental Development Tax Credit, REv. FED. SUPPORT TO RES. &
DEv. (2011), http://rd-review.ca/eic/site/033.nsf/vwapj/4_AssessingtheSREDTaxCredit
-eng.pdf/$FILE/4jAssessing-the SRED Tax Credit-eng.pdf [hereinafter Canada SR&ED
Study].
79. Gunz et al., supra note 78, at 2021.
so. Canada SR&ED Study, supra note 78, at 8. The vast difference between these estimates
probably reflects the size of the firms being surveyed. The Gunz study had seven responses
from companies claiming credits over $i million, Gunz et al., supra note 78, at 2022 tbl. 4 ,
whereas the more recent survey's highest range seems to have been $250,000-$500,000.
Canada SR&ED Study, supra note 78, at 8.
830
123: 812 2013
THE CASE FOR TAX
claimed credit. For Canadian taxpayers with the smallest claims (less than
$25,000), compliance costs were over one third of the credit amount."' This
results from fixed costs, such as filling out the requisite paperwork, that the
firms had to incur regardless of their claim.82 There is also, however, a fairly
substantial variable component of the compliance costs: some large firms
claiming the credit can spend over $100,000 to comply, much of that going to
technical documentation of the research activities.
I know of no comparable surveys of American firms' compliance costs for
the research tax credit.8 4 As a general matter, there is no obvious reason why
recordkeeping requirements should be qualitatively different between Canada
and the United States. If anything, the costs in the United States may be
decreasing, as recent decisions have allowed taxpayers to use a fair estimate of
their expenses in claiming the credit, which should ease contemporaneous
recordkeeping burdens.s
Finally, it is important to take note of costs that are absent from the tax
system. Since tax subsidies confer no property rights, there are no enforcement
costs of tax."' Additionally, there is no international component to the tax
system. While it is surely true that foreign countries give credits for research,
inventors need not (and typically cannot) claim those credits alongside U.S.
federal tax credits.
81. Canada SR&ED Study, supra note 78, at 8.
82. Gunz et al., supra note 78, at 2019-20; Canada SR&ED Study, supra note 78, at 8.
83. Gunz et al., supra note 78, at 2020.
84. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some companies forgo claiming the research tax credit
because of compliance costs. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1o-136,
THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT'S DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION CAN BE IMPROVED 33-34 (2009)
(noting that "[t]he burden of substantiating research credit claims represents a significant
discouragement to potential credit users").
85. See United States v. McFerrin, 570 F.3d 672, 679 (5th Cir. 2009) (approving the use of
reasonable taxpayer estimates for claimed research tax credits); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1207, 1268 (2009), affd, 697 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2012) (same).
86. An inventor claiming the research tax credit may incur costs defending an audit or bringing
a court case to obtain a refund. While one might argue that these are semantically
"enforcement" costs (inasmuch as the government is enforcing the law), they fall under
what I have called compliance costs because they are part of the process of receiving the
credit. These legal costs are equivalent to the costs incurred during the various stages of
review during patent prosecution. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 7(c), 125 Star. 284, 314-15 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 141) (appeal); id. 5
6(a), 125 Stat. at 299-300 (inter partes review); id. 5 6(d), 125 Stat. at 305-06 (post-grant
review).
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3. Comparing the Administrative Costs ofPatent and Tax
We are now in a position to compare the administrative costs of
subsidizing research with the patent and tax systems. Before we actually
compare the two systems, though, it is worth briefly pausing to define the
scope of the problem. Administrative costs are trivial in some situations. If a
pharmaceutical giant is considering whether to begin a billion-dollar research
project for a breast cancer drug, the cost of patenting versus the cost of filing a
tax return would be drops in the bucket. However, administrative costs are
significant when the expected value of the invention is on par with the
administrative costs themselves. In other words, the discussion below is mainly
confined to smaller-stakes inventions, when an inventor might forgo research
because the cost of patent prosecution or tax compliance makes the research
not worth it.
Can we make a ballpark comparison of the costs of tax compliance and
patent's administrative costs? A first-pass look at the data suggests that, for
some innovation environments, it is reasonable to estimate that costs for tax
compliance and patent prosecution (not enforcement) are roughly equal. First,
using the Canadian data, small- and medium-sized businesses claiming the
research tax credit spend approximately 5% of their credit on compliance
costs.81 Second, although there is significant variability across industries, these
businesses generate approximately one patent application for every $1.8 million
in R&D expenditures." Third, assuming that the entirety of the $1.8 million
87. Gunz et al., supra note 78, at 2024 tbl.6. Small- and medium-sized businesses, in this
context, are businesses with up to 1,ooo employees. The 5% figure, unfortunately, has
several limitations. The Gunz, Macnaughton & Wensley dataset conflates businesses
receiving the 35% Canadian refundable credit with businesses receiving the 20% credit,
which would deflate the compliance expenditure percentage relative to what it would be for
American companies, as American companies only receive a 20% credit. On the other hand,
since I am ultimately interested in compliance costs for expenditures on the order of several
million dollars, the 5% figure is likely an overestimation, since compliance costs plateau
dramatically as research expenditures exceed $1 million. See id. at 2022 tbl. 4. For that reason,
and because firms spending in excess of $i million on research tend to only spend
approximately 2% of their credit on compliance, I think my figure of 5% is a conservatively
high estimate. Even if this figure is incorrect by several percentage points either way, it
would not affect my qualitative conclusions.
88. See Brandon Shackelford, One in Five U.S. Businesses with R&D Applied for a U.S. Patent in
2oo8, NAT'L Sci. FOUND. (Feb. 2013), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsfl3307
/nsfi3307.pdf. To arrive at this figure, I first calculated total R&D expenditures for
businesses with up to i,ooo employees ($72,183,000,000); I then divided by the total
number of patent applications for businesses in that same category (39,680).
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qualified for the research credit, that expenditure would yield a compliance cost
of $18,000.89 Patent prosecution costs around $20,ooo.90 Thus, the tax
compliance and patent prosecution costs of generating a single invention are
(very roughly)9 ' equal. But this is not the end of the story. The administrative
costs of both patent and tax are different in at least three important ways that
could make tax the preferable choice for subsidies in particular research
environments.
The first difference is that the administrative costs of patent accrue per
invention, whereas the costs for subsidizing research with tax credits accrue
across inventions. If a researcher is relying on the patent system, she will have
to pay filing fees and attorney fees for every invention she wishes to patent. If,
instead, she relies on the tax system, her compliance costs will not depend on
the number of discoveries she makes. This difference suggests that, in
situations where we expect a line of research to generate many discoveries that
would need to be independently patented, the tax system may entail lower
administrative costs. The consequence of this difference is that the tax system
would deter fewer inventors from pursuing socially desirable lines of research.
What industries might exhibit such a pattern? One likely candidate is
genetic research. The Federal Circuit has held that inventors may patent
isolated genetic sequences.92 The human genome contains tens of thousands of
protein-coding genes. 93 Even more strikingly, the field of synthetic biology-in
which inventors create new, artificial sequences -removes any upper limit on
patentable sequences. 94 Discovering one of these sequences is becoming
increasingly routine as costs have come down.9 5 Thus, individual lines of
ag. Because the credit amounts to 20% of the expenditure (in this case, roughly $360,ooo of the
$1.8 million), and compliance costs are 5% of that credit.
go. See supra Subsection II.A.i.
91. This back-of-the-envelope calculation is only meant to show that compliance costs and
prosecution costs are on the same order of magnitude.
92. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing an examiner's denial of a patent
for an isolated DNA strand).
93. About the Human Genome Project, HUM. GENOME PROJECT, http://web.ornl.gov/sci
/techresources/Human 
_Genome/project/index.shtm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
94. See generally Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85
TEX. L. REv. 1745 (2007) (defining synthetic biology and exploring attendant ramifications
for intellectual property law).
95. See DNA Sequencing Costs, NAT'L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov
/sequencingcosts (last updated July 16, 2013) (charting the decreasing cost of sequencing
over the years); see also Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing
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genetic research often yield a multitude of inventions. Indeed, in the field of
synthetic biology, the number of "parts" (functional proteins coded by man-
made genetic sequences) has proliferated in recent years,96 but many, if not
most, of these parts are unpatented, likely because of the high cost of a
patent.97 In such a field, increased tax credits could function as a less
distortionary subsidy by avoiding the high costs of patenting many small
inventions.
A second difference between tax and patent is that tax subsidies are free
from enforcement costs. This has several implications. In industries where use
is difficult to detect, patent enforcement will be expensive, which will distort
investment decisions. Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed-in their article about
the continuum of patent excludability- offer surgical checklists as an example
of an invention that an inventor would have a hard time excluding doctors
from using.98 They argue that such inventions are difficult to appropriate value
from. But we can flip this argument on its head: if an inventor of a surgical
checklist wanted to exclude competitors, she would need to engage in costly
monitoring of the surgical practices in thousands of hospitals nationwide.
Moreover, every time the inventor detected a violation, she would need to be
able to credibly threaten litigation. These administrative costs might deter an
inventor from pursuing a line of research. Thus, enforcement costs will be high
in industries with many possible infringers. And if those infringers are not
wealthy, the expected value of litigation against them would be low.
Enforcement costs will also be higher in industries that are geographically
New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 834 (1999) (noting that "routine, automated
methods" and the low bar for patentability have resulted in biotechnology companies
"seeking patents on hundreds of thousands of DNA sequence fragments").
g6. For statistics on the total number of "parts" that scientists have made available to each other,
see Statistics Snapshot, REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, http://partsregistry.org
/cgVpartsdb/Statistics.cgi (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). The number of parts in this registry
currently totals over 7,ooo; this number has more than doubled over the last eight years. See
Kumar & Rai, supra note 94, at 1765 (noting that there were more than 2,000 parts available
in 2005).
g7. Kumar & Rai, supra note 94, at 1764-65 ("The more pressing problem for purposes of
projects like the MIT Registry-which contains more than two thousand standardized
parts-is that a patent-based approach may be quite expensive." (footnote omitted)). It is
impossible to know the total number of synthetic biology parts that exist, as some may be
kept secret by their inventors. However, scientists have added thousands of unpatented
parts to the open source iGEM registry in recent years. See Statistics Snapshot, supra
note 96.
98. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 33, at 1902-03.
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dispersed-it is more costly to monitor and maintain a litigation presence
nationwide. In such industries, policymakers should consider whether tax
incentives might encourage more optimal research decisions.
A third and final difference between tax and patent is that the
administrative costs of tax can be reduced more easily than the costs of patent.
Why is this important? Because when we come across an industry or group-
for instance, small, startup inventors - that might be especially deterred by
administrative costs, a common move is to try to selectively reduce those costs.
If one system is particularly amenable to this sort of reduction, it might be
preferable in those situations where we think administrative costs are
stymying research.
There are a few differences between tax and patent that make the
administrative costs of patenting more difficult to reduce. The first is that we
insist that every patent be examined with the same scrutiny. This is a sensible
choice because a patent confers a powerful right to exclude. But this
fundamental requirement spawns the significant legal costs of patent
prosecution, costs which arguably cannot be reduced."9 In comparison, not
every tax return is audited. This is also sensible. Mistakenly allowing a single
taxpayer to claim an improper research tax credit is typically not especially
costly.oo The corollary to this difference is that we could relax the compliance
requirements for tax in particular situations where administrative costs are
problematic. For instance, if we were concerned that small businesses faced
high fixed compliance costs of claiming the research credit, we could reduce
documentation requirements if their credit stayed under a certain dollar
amount. By comparison, reducing patent prosecution requirements for a small
business - for instance, by not requiring them to report prior art - would lead
to improper grants of monopoly protection that could cause significant
economic harm.' Another reason administrative costs are more easily
g. The tax code does permit a deduction for patent prosecution costs. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-
2(a)(1) (2012).
ioo. The social welfare costs of improperly allowing a tax credit are the distortionary costs
associated with collecting taxes to pay that tax credit, where the credit itself is capped at the
researcher's own expenditures. See supra Section I.C. The social welfare costs of improperly
granting a patent depend on the exclusionary and monopoly effects of that patent, see supra
Section I.B, which are uncapped and much more variable.
ol. Congress is aware of the problem that small businesses face when trying to get a patent, and
yet the only change passed into law has been a reduction in filing fees. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § ii(d), 125 Stat. 284, 323 (2011) (to be codified at
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mitigated for tax is that the subsidy itself can be tailored to compensate for the
administrative costs. For instance, we might worry that a business filing for the
credit for the first time would face burdensome fixed startup costs. If so, we
could simply double the allowable credit for that year. Since the tax subsidy
and compliance costs are in the same units (dollars), they can easily make up
for each other. In contrast, it is not clear how a patent could be made stronger
to compensate for high administrative costs. The takeaway from this point is
that the administrative costs of tax are much more flexible than the
administrative costs of patent, and where administrative costs are distorting
research decisions, policymakers should consider whether a reduced-
compliance-cost tax regime might be optimal.
Finally, while my focus in this Note is largely on the either/or choice
between patent and tax, I should note that there are likely viable hybrid
approaches - that is, ways in which the tax and patent systems could be
deployed together to compensate for each other's weaknesses. A simple
example would be a patent prosecution tax credit. The status quo already
allows inventors to deduct the costs of patent prosecution. o2 But the tax code
could provide a stronger incentive. For example, we might give a tax credit of
up to $20,000 for prosecution costs for any inventor with fewer than three
patents. A promising avenue for future work would be to think of creative ways
that patent and tax can be coordinated to spur innovation.
B. Subsidy Timing
In this Section, I explore how the difference in the timing of the patent and
tax subsidy systems affects how they should be deployed. Whereas the
subsidies from tax are paid out annually, patent subsidies (in the form of
higher profits) can be delayed for many years. This difference has gone largely
unnoticed in the academic literature. Several scholars have pointed out that
inventions can take decades to commercialize, which might decrease or
eliminate the usefulness of the patent system as a means to stimulate
836
35 U.S.C. § 4 1(h)). As discussed, this does little to mitigate the most significant costs of
patent prosecution. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
ioz. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1).
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research.o3 These scholars have suggested lengthening patent protection"o' or
granting new intellectual property rights focused on product development."os
What these solutions miss-likely because of their single-institution focus on
the patent system-is that the payment lag in the patent system is itself quite
costly. The tax system avoids this cost by reimbursing the taxpayer
immediately.
Delay can undermine a subsidy system. This is so because there are implicit
costs in an inventor tying up her own funds in research.o' Each dollar spent on
research is a dollar that the inventor cannot put to other productive uses, such
as growing her business.o 7 Every year that passes between the initial
expenditure and the eventual subsidy, the inventor has to forgo the yield on
that expenditure. These delay costs may undermine the efficacy of innovation
subsidies: the researcher will only engage in research if current costs are less
than the eventual expected value of the research plus the subsidy, discounted
by the time delay of the subsidy. The "discount" the researcher assigns to the
subsidy will be a function of two things: the length of the delay itself and the
annual implicit costs of the delay. I treat each of these concerns in turn, and I
conclude that long delays are most harmful to small inventors and to
inventions with long time horizons. In such situations, I argue that tax may be
a preferable choice.
1. Subsidy Timing in Patent and Tax
There are a number of ways to make money from a patent, but most of
them require patience. When we think about subsidy timing and patent, it is
helpful to divide the process into three phases: first, the inventor conducts the
research; second, the inventor applies for a patent; and third, someone
develops and commercializes products based on the patent. In the paradigm
case, the inventor is the "someone" exploiting the patent. Since the inventor
has an exclusive right to sell the invention, she can earn supracompetitive
103. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L.
REv. 1o65 (2007); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010).
104. See Abramowicz, supra note 103, at 11o8-14 (proposing an auction system for extending
patent durations).
ios. See Sichelman, supra note 103, at 402-12 (laying out the details of a proposal for
commercialization patents).
io6. See N. GREGORYMANKIw, PRINCIPLES or EcoNoMICS 261-62 (6th ed. 2012).
107. I explore these costs at greater length infra Subsection II.B.2.
837
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
profits, which act as the subsidy of the patent system. But this subsidy is
delayed in a few ways.
An inventor must first wait through the invention process, and she must
spend whatever is necessary to uncover the patentable idea. For research that
requires significant upfront investments, this delay can be costly.
Second, the inventor must wait for the PTO to evaluate and issue the
patent. The median delay between patent application and patent issuance is
three to four years,os although now, under the America Invents Act, patent
examination can be expedited for a fee of $2,000 for a small entity or $4,000
for a non-small entity."o9
And third-assuming the patentee is exploiting the patent herself-she
must wait until the product is developed and ready to commercialize before
realizing any of the patent subsidy. It is difficult to generalize about how long it
takes a firm to commercialize a new invention: the delay depends on the field
of technology, the size of the firm, and, of course, the invention itself."o
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that commercializing an invention can take a
while. The U.S. patent system encourages patents to be filed early in the
product development cycle by setting low patentability requirements and by
granting patent rights to the first to file."' Indeed, examples abound of famous
inventions that were not commercialized for decades, including television (35-
year delay between patentable invention and product), radio (15 years), and
penicillin (16 years)."' I'll put to one side the worry-which has been explored
by others"'- that our 20-year patent term might not provide much incentive
for inventions with these lag times, and I will assume that the patent system is
providing the inventor a subsidy that would induce the research. My focus,
rather, is on the costs of the delay itself. It is important to note that these delays
are inherent in the patent system: until the inventor puts her invention into
log. Average Patent Application Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 12, 2011, 6:26 AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2oll/12/average-patent-application-pendency.html.
iog. See USPTO's Prioritized Patent Examination Program FAQs, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov
/patents/init events/trackijAQS.jsp (last updated Aug. 9, 2013, 12:43 PM).
11o. For a good discussion of the factors that go into the decision to commercialize, see Office of
Tech. Assessment, Innovation and Commercialization of Emerging Technologies, U.S. CONG.
49-60 (1995), http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9539.pdf.
iii. See Abramowicz, supra note 103, at 1079, 1094-95; Sichelman, supra note 103, at 372-73.
112. Kitch, supra note 32, at 272.
113. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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practice and sells her products, we have no way of knowing how big the
subsidy should be. Delay is the price we pay for precision.
Of course, there are other ways to profit from patents, which could
potentially make delay a nonissue. The main one is licensing. A patent license
is a contract whereby the patent holder agrees to refrain from suing the licensee
for infringement. Most licenses are granted in exchange for royalties, plus,
oftentimes, a lump-sum payment."4 Inventors can also assign their patent
rights, which grants all of the patentee's rights to the assignee. These
contractual relationships are often undertaken when the inventor lacks
sufficient complementary assets - such as manufacturing, marketing, and
distribution networks -to commercialize the invention.ns
Royalty payments are subject to the same delay problems as direct
commercialization. Selling one's patent rights outright with an assignment
might seem to circumvent the delay problem, but the inventor will typically be
forced to take a discount if the invention is not likely to yield a profit for quite
some time. Indeed, licensing regimes generally are characterized by a less-than-
full subsidy for the inventor, who has to share the profits with the licensee or
assignee with superior commercializing capabilities." 6 Given a choice, firms
opt for commercialization over licensing."' Since licensing is generally a
second-best approach to earning the patent subsidy, I will not consider it
any further.
Timing for the tax system is quite a bit simpler. Since taxes are collected
annually, a researcher should not have to wait much more than a year to earn
her research tax credit. The tax system can distribute its subsidy so quickly
because it is directed at expenditures. When claiming the tax credit, a
researcher need not wait to see if her research is marketable. A small wrinkle is
that, under the current tax system, the research tax credit is nonrefundable.
That means that it is only useful to taxpayers who actually have a tax bill
(which the credit reduces). For taxpayers who do not owe taxes, their research
114. E.g., Mariko Sakakibara, An Empirical Analysis of Pricing in Patent Licensing Contracts, 19
INDUS. & COP. CHANGE 927, 928 (2010).
1s. See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285, 288-93 (1986).
116. A related reason why licensing is a subpar tool is that the licensor and the licensee have less-
than-full knowledge about the value of the patent. Sakakibara, supra note 114, at 929-31.
117. See id. at 941-42 (noting that larger firms with capabilities prefer to commercialize rather
than license so as to extract higher profits).
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credit will be, in effect, delayed."' Unused credits can be carried forward for up
to twenty years." 9
Thus far, I have argued that patents, as a general matter, subject the
researcher to much longer delays than does the tax system. However,
policymakers could delve deeper and ask: are there particular industries that
are especially prone to long delays between expenditure and subsidy under the
patent system? I would suggest focusing on industries where the
commercialization process takes the longest. The research phase is variable
both in how long it takes and when expenditures are required, even within
industries. The patent prosecution phase is fairly consistent across industries.
But the time it takes to commercialize inventions can be correlated within an
industry. To illustrate, consider the science of materials. Thomas Eagar has
lamented that commercializing a new material typically takes about two
decades.' This is so because it takes some time for manufacturers to
understand the benefits of a new material and to effectively integrate it into
their products."' And many products are governed by manufacturing
guidelines that make adopting a new material difficult.' These and other
factors make commercializing a new material a lengthy process. Industries with
long commercialization delays would be good candidates for special
tax treatment.
2. Identifying and Curing High Delay Costs
Delays are inherent in the patent system and are largely avoided in tax.'2 3
But, setting aside the length of delay, when will delay be costly? Inventors
sustain the largest implicit costs of delay when their research costs comprise a
us. This has been a subject of criticism, and there have been calls to make the credit refundable.
See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT: CURRENT
LAw, LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS, AND POLICY ISSUES 25 (2012),
http://usbudgetalert.com/Research%2oTax%2oCredit.pdf.
11g. I.R.C. § 39 (2012).
12o. Thomas W. Eagar, Bringing New Materials to Market, 98 TECH. REV. 42,43 (1995).
121. For an example, see id. at 44, which describes the difficulty of using plastics in refrigerators.
122. See id. at 47 (describing the outdated requirements that slowed adoption of new fracture-
resistant steel in boilers).
123. Hemel and Ouellette note that reward timing is continuous; that is, there is an infinite range
of times when we could distribute a subsidy. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4 (manuscript at




THE CASE FOR TAX
large share of their total assets. I hope this point is intuitive: if a startup firm
has access to $1,000,000 of capital, then tying up $800,ooo in research for a
decade will be catastrophic. The impact of such a delay would be to halt the
development of the business itself. Additionally, a company with limited assets
risks bankruptcy in the near term by sinking a large chunk of its assets in
research. Even if the research is highly promising and-in the sense described
in Section L.A-optimal, an inventor might logically shy away from the
research if it exposes her to a high risk of insolvency.'" These two implicit
costs-stymied business development and bankruptcy risk-are most
substantial when the research costs are on par with the total assets of the
inventor. As such, delay will be most costly for lone inventors, small
businesses, and startups.
The credit market can ameliorate the problem of high implicit costs of
delay. If a startup has in mind a line of research that will likely lead to an
extremely profitable invention, a creditor should be willing to finance that
project. Of course, money is not free, and creditors will charge the researcher
interest on the loan. But the capital-poor inventor should be willing to make
modest interest payments, because her capital can be put toward highly
productive activities like growing the business and maintaining a liquidity
cushion to avoid bankruptcy. As such, access to credit should mitigate the cost
of delay by providing the business with cash upfront in exchange for a small
fee. However, if the credit market is not functioning "properly," it might
charge high interest rates even for safe bets, or it might not provide any
additional financing for the research.
There is reason to think that the credit market for financing research is
prone to just such failure. Creditors often cannot get perfect information about
the commercial prospects of research, which deters them from lending money
to the most deserving credit applicants. This information deficit exists for at
least two reasons. First, it is difficult to accurately communicate a research
plan; often, only the researcher himself truly understands the science and the
prospects for success. 2 s Second, inventors have an incentive to keep their ideas
private until after they get paid, and they may resist full disclosure to a creditor
124. Further complicating matters is the fact that inventors are not purely logical. See id.
(manuscript at 31-33) (describing how optimism bias and risk aversion may distort research
decisions).
125. See Richard R. Nelson, The Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature, 32 J. Bus. 101,
121-26 (1959) (describing the difficulty of top-down planning of research priorities and
arguing that the best ideas come from the inventors themselves).
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for fear of being scooped.1' Innovation scholars have understood information
asymmetries for decades, but they have typically marshaled this point against
the federal government as a direct funder of research in order to justify the
patent system. 7 But private-sector creditors are prone to similar mistakes.
High-tech startups, for instance, have a difficult time acquiring debt
financing." And outsiders are notoriously bad at pricing firms with
predominantly intangible assets or high R&D expenditures. 9 Finance scholars
have attributed this to information asymmetries: "[M] anagement ... will often
have far better information about the future profitability of undeveloped
products and untapped market niches." 3 o Thus, we should not rely on the
credit markets to ameliorate the costs of delay inherent in the patent system.
This problem is especially severe for lone inventors, small businesses, and
startups, which, as I discussed earlier, are disadvantaged most by the costs of
delay. These entities are likely to have difficulty securing credit, and thus are
least able to cure their high delay costs. Robert Carpenter and Bruce Petersen
conducted a survey of 2,400 high-tech firms that went public between 1981 and
1998. They found that after an IPO, small companies tended to have less
debt-as a percentage of assets-than large companies."' Even more
importantly, small companies relied almost entirely on secured debt -debt that
is backed by collateral, like buildings.' In contrast, large companies relied
mostly on unsecured debt."13 But secured debt does not ameliorate the delay
costs of patent, since such debt does not depend on profitable ideas but rather
126. Cf Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
HAROLD M. GROvEs, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIvITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 6o9, 615 (1962) (arguing that marketing information is intrinsically
difficult, in part because of the ease with which it may be revealed).
127. See, e.g., id. at 615, 623; Brian D. Wright, The Economics ofInvention Incentives: Patents, Prizes,
and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECoN. REV. 691, 695, 703 (1983).
128. See Robert E. Carpenter & Bruce C. Petersen, Capital Market Imperfections, High-Tech
Investment, and New Equity Financing, 112 EcON. J. F54, F64, F68-69 (2002).
129. See, e.g., David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Information Asymmetty, R&D, and Insider Gains, 55 J.
FIN. 2747, 2749-50 (2000); Louis K.C. Chan, Josef Lakonishok & Theodore Souggiannis,
The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures, S6 J. FIN. 2431, 2432
(2001).
130. Bradford Cornell & Alan C. Shapiro, Financing Corporate Growth, i J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 6,
14 (1988).
131. Carpenter & Petersen, supra note 128, at F66-67 & tbl.4 (row 8).
132. Id. at F67-68 & tbl.4 (row 9).
133. Id. at F68.
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on owning mortgageable property. Equity is also of little help: selling a portion
of one's future profits diminishes the incentive to capitalize on the patent.'4
These data paint a bleak picture for small firms relying on patents: they face
high implicit costs from sinking money into research and they are unable to
sustain themselves with credit.
The previous discussion might be clarified by a quick illustration. Imagine
a small business with an idea for a new photon torpedo. The business could
pay for the research itself, but it would have to reduce its production of ray
guns, which it could only do for a short period before going out of business.
Instead, it goes to the bank for a loan. The bank is clueless about photon
torpedoes, so it insists that the company mortgage its warehouse. But the
company protests: mortgaging the warehouse was the backup plan in case the
market weakened and bankruptcy threatened. If patent is the only option, the
company abandons the research: it can't afford the capital in the near term
even if it thinks it could make money once it has commercialized the photon
torpedo. But what about applying for a tax credit?
Policymakers could use the tax system to selectively bolster the domains of
research where the patent system falters because of delay costs. For instance,
tax credits could be targeted at the small businesses and lone inventors most
likely to find the delay of the patent system unpalatable. In the previous
example, the company might have researched the photon torpedoes if it could
have been reimbursed with tax credits quickly. In order to target the credit at
companies who truly need it, policymakers could increase the percentage of
research expenditures reimbursed for companies with no more than a certain
number of employees or amount of gross income. To minimize the
distortionary effects of taxation, this small business R&D bump could be
capped at a particular reimbursement amount to ensure that only the
company's top-priority research projects would be funded at this favorable
rate. But the tax system is extremely flexible, and we could perhaps be even
more creative. For example, if we were primarily concerned with startup
companies' access to capital, we might consider a very large credit for the first
three years of the startup's existence, which the startup would have to pay off
through later rate hikes. If the problem is that startups lack access to credit,
why not provide them with precisely that?
This could also be an opportunity to deploy a hybrid patent-tax approach.
As we have seen, one of the longest delays in the patent system is that
associated with commercialization. This delay cost could be alleviated with the
134. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4 (manuscript at 26).
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tax system. The IRS already treats a patent as conclusive evidence that a line of
research is technological in nature. 3s This eases the burden on the inventor
claiming the tax credit, but it does little to alleviate the costs of delay. Instead,
we could provide a larger tax credit to inventors receiving a patent. This credit
could apply retroactively to research that led to the discovery. The goal of this
credit would be to target those inventors most likely to be experiencing delay
costs in the near term. To even better effectuate this goal, we could impose a
"commercialization" requirement: receiving the additional tax benefit could be
contingent on producing evidence of a good faith effort to commercialize the
product. Such a credit would be most beneficial to small entities, and could be
so directed as described in the previous paragraph.
More favorable tax treatment could also be accorded to entities engaged in
research in fields with long commercialization periods. Of course, this sort of
"winner picking" is a dangerous game: the tax and patent systems are agnostic
about subject matter precisely because we think the government is bad at
choosing which research is worthy of help. That said, the tax system is littered
with subsidies for favored types of research."' In contrast to such existing
subsidies-which are arguably not based on economic logic but on policy
preferences - choosing to give favorable treatment to, for example, materials
science research would be based on an identifiable market failure.
C. Rewarding Failure
The previous Section explored when the tax and patent systems distribute
their subsidies. But there are also salient differences in what sorts of research
these regimes subsidize. As a general rule, the tax subsidy is broader than the
patent subsidy. If we can identify situations where the scope of the patent
subsidy is inefficiently narrow, the tax system may be a good candidate to fill
that gap. In this Section, I argue that one such area where tax could be valuable
is in correcting patent's inability to subsidize "valuable failure."
I have already explained the difference between the patent and tax subsidy
regimes.3 As relevant for our purposes here, patents are only awarded for new
inventions, and the patent subsidy is only available through commercialization.
135. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., I.R.C. 5 41(a)(3) (2012) (energy research tax credit); id. 5 45C (tax credit for
research on orphan drugs, which are designed to treat rare diseases).
137. See supra note 55-59 and accompanying text.
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Tax has no such requirement. The success or failure of a course of research
does not affect the research's qualification for the tax credit.
This difference will affect the decision to research. All else equal, the patent
system should bias researchers to undertake projects with higher likelihoods of
success and commercial applicability. Indeed, this is an intended effect of
patent, as the traditional model of innovation assumes that research enhances
social welfare by producing socially useful innovations.38 On the other hand,
commentators have criticized the tax system's lack of selectivity for success as
failing to properly align research incentives with social welfare.13 9 They have
recommend moving to a prize-like system where the credit is only available for
successful discoveries 4o or for projects approved by the government. 4 ' I don't
disagree with these critiques, but I also think they paint an incomplete picture.
An oft-overlooked issue is the social welfare benefit of failed research. Sean
Seymore's recent article on the topic summarizes the concept nicely: "Failure is
the basis of much scientific progress because it plays a key role in building
knowledge." 42 A failed experiment always produces some data, if only that a
particular technique is ineffective. But failure can be even more valuable as a
way of exploring uncharted territory and constructing a knowledge base.
Consider a few examples where researchers have found their own failures to be
valuable.143 In her book on innovation, Dorothy Leonard-Barton recounts an
incident concerning the development of a new metal alloy at Johnson &
Johnson.'" To encourage experimentation, the vice president of operations
required his chief metallurgist to discard two out of every three test batches of
138. E.g., William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic
Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 274 (1966) ("The principal determinant of the social value of an
invention is the extent to which it is useful and used."); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note
4, at 531-34 (posing a model where social welfare is contingent on the "probability of an
innovation").
139. E.g., GUENTHER, supra note 118, at 30-31; Michael D. Rashkin, The Dysfunctional Research
Credit Hampers Innovation, 131 TAx NOTES 1057 (2011).
140. Johnson, supra note 2, at 612.
141. Rashkin, supra note 139.
142. Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2041 (2012).
143. To be clear, these examples concern failures that are valuable primarily to the researchers
themselves. As discussed below, the important shortcoming of the patent system occurs
where the failures also are valuable to the rest of society. See infra note 154 and
accompanying text.
144. DOROTHY LEONARD-BARTON, WELLSPRINGS OF KNOWLEDGE: BUILDING AND SUSTAINING
THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 122-23 (1995).
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metal.14 s The metallurgist went on to discover the alloy within a year,
presumably because he was free to experiment with more risky mixtures.
Failures are often literally stockpiled: pharmaceutical companies typically keep
"chemical libraries" of the chemical compounds they synthesize, which can be
screened for possible future treatments.14
In innovation environments where failures are valuable, and where these
failures are communicated beyond the researcher herself, the patent system will
systematically fail to subsidize some research that is socially beneficial. Patent
law only operates on successful innovations. Even if patent law is maximally
effective-in that the social value of the patented inventions is wholly
appropriable by the inventor-it will fail to calibrate research decisions to the
value generated by failed experiments. Any regime that rewards researchers
solely based on their successful discoveries will be subject to this critique. The
research tax credit is not such a regime. If we could know the expected social
value of research failure, we could increase the credit to correct for this
inefficiency. Of course, this would be a difficult value to ascertain. But the
research tax credit, unlike the patent regime, at least provides a lever that is
capable of capturing value from failed experiments, however roughly. The
concern with implementing a credit of this sort - as with all tax credits - is that
the subsidy would be too large and would encourage research with total costs
higher than total expected social value. Thus, we should try to tailor the credit
narrowly to compensate for situations where the patent system has failed most
egregiously. This will occur when failure is the most socially valuable.
One area where failure will often be quite valuable is in emerging
industries. The canonical illustration is perhaps the invention of the
incandescent light bulb, which required Thomas Edison and his associates to
conduct over one thousand tests before finding a material that could serve as
the bulb's filament."' More relevant for our purposes is that inventors for
decades before Edison had tried to make a commercially viable incandescent
light bulb but failed, which produced insights-such as the necessity of a
145. Id. at 122.
146. STEFAN H. THOMKE, EXPERIMENTATION MATTERS: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES FOR INNOVATION 24 (2003).
147. Thomas Alva Edison (1847-1931): Electric Light Bulb, MASS. INST. TECH., http://web.mit.edu
/invent/iow/edison.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
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vacuum tube enclosure-that Edison's team would build upon.14 The lesson of
this anecdote has found support in systematic research. James Utterback
describes three phases of an industry's innovative progress: fluid, transitional,
and specific.149 The fluid phase is characterized by significant "target" and
"technical" uncertainty. According to Utterback, the hallmark of target
uncertainty is "the fact that most early innovations do not enjoy an established
market," while technical uncertainty is caused by "the diffused focus of
research and development."s 0 During the fluid phase, firms "have no clear idea
where to place their R&D bets" and they will often "concentrate on product
technologies that ultimately will be ignored by the marketplace.""' In other
words, quite a lot of the early research in an emerging industry fails. A related
line of scholarship concerns the pursuit of radical versus incremental
innovation; unsurprisingly, radical innovation is more characterized by
experimentation and failure."' As an industry matures, the preferences of
consumers become known, standards are established, and the knowledge base
grows. This transition is associated with research becoming more focused and
innovations more incremental.'s
148. Incandescent Lamps, EDISON TECH CENTER, http://www.edisontechcenter.org/incandescent
.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (discussing the discoveries that gave rise to the incandescent
light bulb, including the evolution of vacuum tubes).
149. The clearest description of these phases is at JAMES M. UTTERBACK, MASTERING THE
DYNAMICs OF INNOVATION: How COMPANIES CAN SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FACE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 92-97 (1994). Earlier research first describing these concepts -
although using different terminology -can be found in James M. Utterback & William J.
Abernathy, A Dynamic Model ofProcess and Product Innovation, 3 OMEGA INT'L J. MGMT. SCI.
639 (1975).
150. UTTERBACK, supra note 149, at 93.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Alvaro L6pez Cabrales et al., Managing Functional Diversity, Risk Taking and
Incentives for Teams To Achieve Radical Innovations, 38 R&D MGMT. 35, 45 (20o8) (finding
that radical innovations were more likely where researchers were encouraged to take risks,
such that "success may be less likely"); Robert D. Dewar & Jane E. Dutton, The Adoption of
Radical and Incremental Innovations: An Empirical Analysis, 32 MGMT. SCI. 1422, 1430 (1986)
(finding a correlation between firm size and adoption of radical innovations in the footwear
industry, and hypothesizing that this finding was due to large firms giving researchers
"more slack to permit failures" and allowing "more risk-taking"). For a good description of
radical innovation, see Christine S. Koberg, Dawn R. Detienne & Kurt A. Heppard, An
Empirical Test of Environmental, Organizational, and Process Factors Affecting Incremental and
Radical Innovation, 14 J. HIGH TECH. MGMT. RES. 21, 23 (2003), which describes it as
"making obsolete the old" and "serv[ing] to create new industries, products, or markets."
153. Utterback & Abernathy, supra note 149, at 644.
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The above discussion gives rise to the following recommendation:
emerging industries would be good candidates for a boosted research tax
credit. While this proposition may be uncontroversial, I believe the logic is
novel: the patent system does not sufficiently compensate this research because
such research often produces valuable failures. These failures are "valuable"
inasmuch as they map out uncharted territories and produce intermediate
discoveries that are not themselves commercially viable. We could use tax
credits to selectively boost these fields while they are in the fluid stage.
A reasonable objection to this proposal is that most failures are not socially
valuable because they are not publicized. To the extent that a researcher's
failures only help herself, they are mere research costs, which should be
properly. calibrated by the patent system. 154 However, there are several reasons
to think that some failures are disseminated and thus are valuable not just to
the researcher but to society at large.
The classic failed experiment in basic research is one that produces no effect
and thus does not give rise to any patentable invention. While it is certainly
true that academia disfavors failed experiments, especially in top-tier journals
like Nature and Science, many run-of-the-mill journals accept well-conducted
studies yielding negative results.'s Several journals are specifically dedicated to
publishing such experiments. s6 And, in at least some academic disciplines, it is
common to share data of all sorts amongst one's peers.s 7
Failed research initiatives may tend to remain more secretive in commercial
settings, where there is more pressure to protect ideas and data. Nevertheless,
there is reason to believe that some failure data leak out. First, a line of research
154. For example, to the extent that a pharmaceutical company's chemical library is a useful tool
in promoting that company's future discoveries, the company-operating in a patent-only
system-would value failures inasmuch as they contributed to its library. However, to the
extent that the company's competitors could access the company's chemical library and use
the library to produce their own valuable discoveries, the company would not take into
account the full social value of its failures.
155. A quick glance through a recent issue of the Journal of Vision is illustrative. E.g., Allison M.
McKendrick & Josephine Battista, Perceptual Learning of Contour Integration Is Not
Compromised in the Elderly, J. VISION, Jan. 4, 2013, at 1.
156. E.g., ALL RESULTS JOURNALS, http://www.ajournals.com/ojs (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
157. I can speak from personal experience about the discipline of neuroscience, which has an
annual convention where tens of thousands of researchers converge to present whatever
project they worked on over the previous year. Soc'Y FOR NEUROSCIENCE,
http://www.sfn.org/annual-meeting/neuroscience-2o13 (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). These
experiments are frequently unfinished or negative: the annual meeting is an opportunity to
exchange ideas about how to move these projects forward.
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may "fail" and still produce a marketable product. This is the case because -for
our purposes -"failure" simply means that the line of research is not receiving
much or any patent subsidy. A simple example is the video game industry in
the 1970s and '8os: dozens of innovative hardware systems competed for
market share and influenced future design choices, but many of them were
flops. Some of these failures were cautionary tales to future game designers;"s'
others provided important insights that paved the way for eventual success. 159
These failed designs produced social value that went largely uncompensated by
the patent system by dint of lack of sales but they were nonetheless
shared publicly.
There is also reason to believe that data about failure leak out even absent
any commercialization. In one classic study by Levin and colleagues, the
researchers conducted a wide-ranging survey of high-level executives in various
R&D-heavy industries."o While not the focus of their study, many of their
inquiries focused on the ways in which these industry insiders acquired
knowledge about their competitors' innovations. Unsurprisingly, patent
disclosures and publications rated as moderately useful for most industries."'
Importantly for our purposes, however, there were a substantial number of
industries where "conversations with employees of [the] innovating firm" and
"hiring R&D employees from [the] innovating firm" were reported to be
important ways of learning about competitors' technologies.162 I would submit
is8. To give just one example, the Vectrex bucked industry norms by using vector graphics
instead of the raster display typical of home consoles at the time. The Vectrex was a market
failure, though, and vector graphics have been abandoned in modern gaming systems. See
Mark J.P. Wolf, Vector Games, in THE VIDEO GAME EXPLOSION: A HISTORY FROM PONG TO
PLAYSTATION® AND BEYOND 67, 71 (Mark J.P. Wolf ed., 2008); Matt Barton & Bill
Loguidice, A History of Gaming Platforms: The Vectrex, GAMASUTRA (Dec. 17, 2007),
http://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/3117/ahistory of gamingplatforms the .php.
15. An example is the Shooting Gallery, released for the Magnavox Odyssey in 1972. This video
game peripheral was the first light gun usable on a home video game system. The Shooting
Gallery did not sell well. See Shaun Gegan et al., Magnavox Odyssey FAQ PONG-STORY,
http://www.pong-story.com/oifaq.txt (last updated Nov. 27, 2oo9). Nevertheless, it
arguably set the stage for the development of the immensely popular Zapper for the
Nintendo Entertainment System thirteen years later. Sammy Barker, A Brief History of the
Light Gun on Nintendo, NINTENDO LIFE (Nov. 2, 2007, 8:2o AM), http://
www.nintendolife.con/news/2o07/u1/abrief historyofthe_1ightgpnon nintendo.
160. Levin et al., supra note 17, at 788-90.
161. Id. at 8o6 tbl.6.
162. Id.; see also Eric von Hippel, Cooperation Between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading, 16
RES. POL'Y 291, 291-92, 297-300 (1987) (describing the informal exchange of knowledge
between competitors and providing an economic justification for such behavior). Professor
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that these informal channels of communication must consist of information
about failures, as I define them. An R&D executive can learn about a successful
line of research by reading a patent or reverse engineering a product. Informal
modes of communication are only valuable if they yield information about lines
of research that don't otherwise become public. The Levin study further found
that there were clusters of industries where such "interpersonal channels of
spillover were most important.",,6 3 Examples abound of industries where
competitors cooperate through both formal and informal networks to
overcome common research problems. 6 ' Tax incentives aimed at promoting
socially valuable failure would be most useful in those industries where ideas
are more freely exchanged.
Finally, we should consider measures that would be designed to promote
the dissemination of valuable failure information. Professor Seymore has put
forward one such idea, which he calls the "null patent.",,16 This would provide
inventors with centrally distributed incentives for disclosing their failed
projects. Another possibility would be to tie disclosure to the receipt of the tax
von Hippel has further elaborated on this model to account for the rise of open source
software and other "free reveal" behavior by users. Dietmar Harhoff, Joachim Henkel & Eric
von Hippel, Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users Benefit by Freely
Revealing Their Innovations, 32 RES. POL'Y 1753, 1759-67 (2003).
163. Levin et al., supra note 17, at 807; see also Reinhilde Veugelers, Collaboration in R&D: An
Assessment of Theoretical and Empirical Findings, 146 DE ECONOMIST 419, 436 tbl.3 (1998)
(reporting similar data for Flemish companies); Najib Harabi, Channels of R&D Spillovers:
An Empirical Investigation (MPRA Paper No. 26270, 1995) (obtaining similar results from a
survey of Swiss companies and reporting inter-industry differences in the importance of
informal disclosure channels).
164. The classic illustration of cooperation amongst competitors is Silicon Valley: "By the early
1970s Silicon Valley was distinguished by the speed with which technical skill and know-
how diffused within a localized industrial community.... Individuals moved between firms
and projects without the alienation that might be expected with such a high degree of
mobility . . . ." ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SIncoN VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 37 (1996). To offer a more specific example, consider
SEMATECH. This research consortium was founded by a group of domestic manufacturers
that produced the vast majority of semiconductors. See Larry D. Browning, Janice M. Beyer
& Judy C. Shetler, Building Cooperation in a Competitive Industry: SEMATECH and the
Semiconductor Industry, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 113, 115 (1995). Participant firms assign
researchers to work in SEMATECH laboratories for several years to overcome basic design
problems that face the entire industry. Id. at 116. Finally, for an in-depth investigation of
information trading in the steel industry, see von Hippel, supra note 162, at 292-96. See also
Harhoff et al., supra note 162, at 1757-59 (describing several examples of strategic innovation
disclosures by users to influence the production processes of manufacturers).
165. Seymore, supra note 142, at 2048.
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benefits themselves. This idea would need to overcome two significant
limitations. First, such a system would be expensive for both the monitoring
agency and the complying firm. Second, firms might be reluctant to accept tax
funds if they had to forfeit the benefits of lead time and secrecy. We can
envision some possible solutions, however. To lower the costs for the
government, reporting could be monitored by random audit. To lower costs
for firms, the reporting itself could consist of mere notice of the research.
Curious competitors could be responsible for shouldering additional costs of
transmitting data. To allay concerns about competitive advantage, the
reporting could be delayed -after all, firms may not be sure what is a success or
failure for quite some time. The system could give firms a several-year grace
period before they would be required to report their failed experiments. These
suggestions, of course, are mere rough sketches -much more work is required
to explore how the research community can overcome the problem of
underreporting valuable failures.
D. Institutional Competence
In this final Section, I will consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the actual institutions that implement patent and tax. By "institutions," I am
referring collectively to the policymakers, agencies, adjudicators, and other
individuals that are responsible for legislating and executing the tax and patent
laws. I will argue that there are substantial differences between the institutions
that oversee and implement patent and tax law. In particular, the institution
governing tax law is more flexible and more capable of quickly responding to
policy concerns than the institution that implements patent law, although these
qualities make tax a more difficult regime for researchers to rely on.
These differences recommend using tax in situations where policymakers may
wish to adjust subsidy rules in response to changing circumstances, such as
emerging industries.
1. Comparing Institutional Competences of Tax and Patent
The patent laws are, of course, passed by Congress. Congress doesn't
tinker with them very often,' and when it does, as with the recent America
851
166. Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1965, 1968
(2009) ("Since 1952, Congress has not taken much interest in amending the patent code . ... ").
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Invents Act,'"' the changes are typically procedural.'18 Congress's occasional
tweaks of substantive patent law are usually unsuccessful. An illustrative
example is the special protection afforded to semiconductor chips.'6 This law
provides manufacturers of semiconductor chips with the right to prevent
others from producing chips with identical layouts.o70 But the evolution of the
semiconductor industry made this right irrelevant: small-time copyists cannot
afford the expensive equipment required to manufacture modem chips.'7
Thus, practically no litigation has been brought to enforce the statutory
right.'7 ' This illustrates a fundamental problem with congressional control of
innovation policy: Congress is typically either unwilling or incapable of
modifying the details of patent law in response to policy concerns. 73
In most areas of law, Congress would delegate these complicated and
controversial implementation details to an executive agency. The main
executive agency responsible for implementing patent law is the PTO. Clarisa
Long has described recent moves by the PTO to enhance its power. These
include an aggressive campaign for more deference, 7 4 a reorganization of the
PTO that gave the agency more control over budget allocations,7 s and a push
by the PTO to get greater rulemaking authority.16 Notwithstanding these
power grabs, the PTO is a comparatively weak agency. Critically, the Federal
Circuit has held that the PTO does not have substantive rulemaking
167. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
168. The most significant changes in the America Invents Act include a change to a "first-to-file"
system, id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285-87, and the establishment of post-grant opposition
proceedings, id. § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 300.
169. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2012).
170. Id. § 905.
171. See Dan Callaway, Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry, 4 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 135,
138-40 (2008).
172. Id.
173. Professor Long guesses that Congress may be reluctant to modify patent laws because it sees
those laws as too "complex and technical." Long, supra note 166, at 1969.
174. Id. at 1977; see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1999) (vindicating the PTO's
position that its factual determinations should be reviewed by the Federal Circuit under the
more deferential standards of the APA rather than the less deferential clearly erroneous
standard).
175. Long, supra note 166, at 1973-74.
176. Id. at 1979.
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authority.'77 A consequence of this holding is that courts do not defer to the
PTO on substantive interpretations of the patent statutes." Without the
power to make rules or to make substantive interpretations of the patent laws,
it is not clear that the PTO is in a position to effect any significant changes to
innovation policy.
With Congress uninterested and the PTO powerless, the task of patent
policymaking has fallen to the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit is a twelve-seat court with subject-matter jurisdiction over all
appeals related to patents.17 9 Largely unchecked by the Supreme Court,so the
Federal Circuit is typically the last and loudest voice on all matters patent.
Indeed, Ryan Vacca argues that the Federal Circuit's en banc hearings are
basically equivalent to agency rulemaking proceedings.'"' But the Federal
Circuit is a limited rulemaker for a number of reasons. First, Federal Circuit
policymaking takes a long time. As we have seen, acquiring a patent takes
years.sz Add to that delay the time it takes to bring a lawsuit, to litigate the
case through trial and appeal, and for the Federal Circuit to issue a decision. To
take just one example, in Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., an
en banc decision issued in March 2012, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of
patent infringement.8 3 The patent application was filed on July 11, 2003,84 and
the litigation began in March 2oo6.8s Any policy coming out of the Federal
Circuit will come slowly. 8 6
Even when the Federal Circuit makes decisions, there is no guarantee its
decisions will further laudable innovation policy. Federal Circuit judges do not
177. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
178. Id.; Long, supra note 166, at 1980-82.
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2oo6).
iso. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of
Patent Law, 1o6 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28 (2007).
181. Ryan Vacca, Acting like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 Mo. L. REv.
733 (2011).
182. See supra Section II.B.
183. 672 F.3 d 1350 (2012) (en banc).
184. U.S. Patent No. 6,864,245 (filed July 11, 2003).
185. HemCon, 672 F.3 d at 1355-
186. Arti Rai recently noted the problem of delay associated with ex post decisionmaking and
advocated for giving the PTO more rulemaking authority. Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across
the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DuKE L.J. 1237, 1242
(2012).
853
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
necessarily have the know-how or the raw data to make informed, innovation-
optimizing decisions. Senior Judge Plager has expressed frustration with the
court's inability to discern whether a particular law is sound policy: "How are
the judges to make this assessment? Read newspaper and law review articles?
Hold public hearings? . . . Shall the [Federal Circuit's] rules now include a
requirement that the appellant specify in what manner Congress got its policy
wrong . . . ?"'8 Another problem is that many judges on the Federal Circuit
may be simply unwilling to set policy. Judge Plager, for example, objects
strongly to the notion that the .Federal Circuit should "see to it that the
consequences of the policies and decisions of [Congress and the Supreme
Court] properly reflect current needs and market conditions.""" Indeed,
most appellate judges may see their job as merely "[a]pplying the law""' to
"decide cases."' 90
Despite-or perhaps because of-the Federal Circuit's limitations as a
policymaker, that court has frequently clashed with the executive branch over
patent policy. For example, until recently the Federal Circuit had been
stymying the executive branch's efforts to tighten the patentability of isolated
gene sequences. The DOJ opposes patentability of these sequences.19W
the DOJ has not explained its policy motivations, the ACLU -representing the
party opposed to patentability-has.' 2 The ACLU argued that patents on
isolated DNA would frustrate fiture research. 93 Various amici focused almost
exclusively on this point, warning of a "patent thicket that can inhibit fiture
innovation."' 9 ' But the Federal Circuit roundly rejected the DOJ's position.'9 s
187. S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle: A Response
to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1735,1742 (2007).
188. Id. at 1743.
189. Id. at 1742.
19o. Id. at 1743 (quoting Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.).
191. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 2010-14o6 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29,
2010), 2010 WL 4853320.
192. E.g., Brief for Petitioners, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 353961.
193. Id. at *24-25.
194. E.g., Brief of Genformatic LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 417735, at *5; accord Brief of Amici Curiae,
Information Society Project at Yale Law School Scholars in Support of the Petition, Ass'n for
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The Supreme Court eventually stepped in, siding with the government and
disallowing the patent on the isolated DNA.19 6 But even the Court did not
explicitly consider the policy implications of patenting isolated DNA.'9
The contours of tax policymaking are markedly different. Congress amends
the research tax credit practically every year." These amendments are often
substantive: examples range from changing the credit formula to correct
unintentional disincentives' 99 to adding perks for preferred researchersoo and
research areas.20 '
Courts play a more minor role for tax than for patent. To be sure, many of
the critiques regarding the capacity and willingness of courts to make good
patent policy apply with equal force to tax. Nevertheless, we need not dwell
long on the role of the judiciary, because it occupies a much weaker position
vis-i-vis the other branches. The Court has recently held that the Treasury
Department is entitled to Chevron deference with respect to certain interpretive
regulations, which diminishes the responsibility of courts while strengthening
the agency.202 Additionally, standing doctrine usually denies third parties the
opportunity to challenge tax assessments.2 o3 As a consequence, courts will
rarely have any opportunity to review decisions by the Treasury Department to
let a taxpayer take a beneficial deduction or credit. If Treasury refuses to
challenge an inventor making a bold interpretation in claiming the research tax
credit, that interpretation is de facto law.
For these reasons, the Treasury Department exerts significant control over
tax policy, especially in the administration of tax credits. As such, it is useful to
contrast Treasury and the Federal Circuit as policymakers.2 o' As I discussed
195. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F. 3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2012), af'd in part, revd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
196. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107.
197. See id. at 2117-18.
ig8. See GUENTHER, supra note 118, at 11-15.
19. Id. at 13 (describing changes made to the fixed-base percentage in 1989).
200. Id. at 13-14 (describing amendments to help start-up businesses).
201. Id. at 14 (describing the addition of the tax credit for energy research).
202. Mayo Found. for Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
203. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011).
204. I don't mean to discount Congress as an important player in tax: all of the advantages of the
Treasury Department apply to Congress as well when Congress is enacting tax policy. I
focus on Treasury simply because it is more active.
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earlier, the three main deficits of the Federal Circuit are that it can only make
ex post decisions, it lacks expertise, and it does not prioritize making sound
economic policy. The Treasury Department differs in all three respects.
Perhaps the most important difference between the PTO and the Treasury
Department is that Treasury can issue ex ante guidance. This includes private
letter rulings, technical advice, revenue rulings, and Treasury regulations.os
Some of these are largely informative; private letter rulings, for example, apply
the law to one taxpayer's facts.2o Others are more legislative in character.
Treasury regulations, which the agency typically puts through the notice-and-
comment process,o 7 can be quite substantive. For our purposes, two types of
substantive regulations are particularly important. First, the Treasury
Department can declare that it will not challenge claimed tax credits that meet
some lowered threshold. For example, as I described earlier, Treasury has
recognized a patent safe harbor, whereby obtaining a patent is conclusive
evidence of several of the requirements for claiming the credit.2os Second,
Congress can allow Treasury to propound rules of conduct. For example,
Congress explicitly invited Treasury's help regarding internal-use software,
which does not qualify for the research tax credit "[e]xcept to the extent
provided in regulations."20 9 Treasury issued regulations laying out a three-part
test for qualifying internal-use software,2"o which the agency has subsequently
clarified in the face of public criticism."' These forms of ex ante guidance are
especially suitable for rapidly changing technological landscapes, a point I will
return to in the next Subsection.
The Treasury Department also differs from the Federal Circuit in that it has
the expertise to set policy. An important tool at Treasury's disposal is the
ability to solicit public feedback via notice-and-comment rulemaking. And the
205. John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and
Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 64-65 (2003).
206. Id. at 64 R.148.
207. Id. at 67.
2M8. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(3)(iii) (2012).
209. I.R.C. 5 4 1(d)( 4)(E) (2012). The Treasury Department does not limit its substantive
regulations to instances where they are explicitly called for. E.g., Qualified Research for
Expenditures Paid or Incurred in Taxable Years Ending on or After December 31, 2003, 26
C.F.R. § 1.41-4 (2012) (articulating legal tests to clarify when research is sufficiently
innovative to qualify for the research tax credit).
210. Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 66 Fed. Reg. 280, 292-93 (Jan. 3, 2001); see also id.
at 285-87 (explaining the changes).
211. Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,362, 66,371 (Dec. 26, 2001).
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Treasury Department-which houses departments including the Office of Tax
Analysis and the Office of Economic Policy-is well situated to evaluate the
economic effects of innovation policy. Of course, we should not overestimate
Treasury's expertise. Tax lawyer Michael Rashkin has criticized Treasury's
capacity to administer the credit.m' He argues that the National Science
Foundation would be a better agency to allocate the subsidy. 13 I don't disagree
with Rashkin-the Treasury Department may lack the technical expertise that
would be necessary to best implement the tax credit. However, compared to
the Federal Circuit, the Treasury Department is the clearly superior
policymaker. Treasury can hire expert staff, consult other agencies, and solicit
public comments. None of my policy recommendations actually turn on
Treasury itself having the final word; rather, they all turn on choosing the
institution of tax - however implemented - over that of patent.
Finally, the Treasury Department, unlike the Federal Circuit, is a willing
policymaker, especially when asked. I don't think this point needs much
elaboration. As discussed above, Treasury is quite capable of passing
regulations to implement statutes. In passing those regulations, Treasury
explicitly considers policy implications. To take just one example, Treasury
decided to extend the credit to internal-use software that is developed in
conjunction with hardware once it realized how prevalent such hardware-
software combinations were.
In sum, Treasury is an active, knowledgeable participant in setting tax
policy, and it is able to issue ex ante substantive rules to guide conduct.
2. Policy Implications
The institutional differences between patent and tax make tax a particularly
useful innovation subsidy for encouraging emerging industries.
As discussed in the previous Subsection, tax policymakers (Treasury, and
to a lesser degree, Congress) are capable of responding to oversights and
inefficiencies quickly, without the delay inherent in the patenting-litigation
process. With this nimbleness, Congress in turn should feel comfortable
passing less definite statutes and delegating interpretive responsibilities to
Treasury. To use a concrete example, consider my suggestion from Section II.A
212. RASHKIN, supra note 39, 915.03.
213. Rashkin, supra note 139, app. I.
214. Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,365.
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that Congress might want to target subsidies at research designed to uncover
new synthetic genetic sequences."s Congress might justifiably be nervous
about altering patent standards for this narrow industry-any ambiguity in the
statute might take the Federal Circuit a decade to hammer out, with no
guarantee that the court's solution would map onto Congress's policy
concerns. In contrast, with a tax credit-based approach, Congress could be
confident that Treasury would issue regulations that consciously targeted the
subsidy at the intended inventors. Treasury would be able to fill the interstices
of the statute with policy-motivated interpretations.
Another advantage of tax's institutional flexibility is that Congress and the
Treasury Department can more easily mold the credit to the changing
circumstances of the targeted industry. Continuing with the previous example,
synthetic biology is still very much a developing discipline. The promise of
"engineering" new genetic sequences has really only become a practical reality
in the last two decades.216 How can we be sure that any subsidy we pass today
will be appropriate a decade from now? What if, in the future, the construction
of new genetic sequences becomes mechanically automated?"' Would the
hypothetical subsidy cover such an eventuality? Using a responsive institution
like tax should alleviate some of our worries about unknowable changes in
technology and market conditions. Treasury and Congress could adapt the tax
credit to the facts on the ground.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that these tweaks by Congress and
Treasury could all be quick. This is critical for emerging fields, where new
technologies will frequently challenge the contours of the established subsidy
regime. The sooner the law can incorporate these new developments into the
scope of the subsidy (or reject them), the more quickly inventors can properly
calibrate their research expenditures. Long-term uncertainty about subsidy
scope will likely make inventors too conservative with their research plans,
which will produce inefficiently low innovation rates.
I should note that the flexible character of tax policymaking is not without
its drawbacks. One of the persistent criticisms of the research tax credit is that
Congress refuses to make it permanent, which induces uncertainty and
215. Supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
216. The key breakthroughs have been rapid DNA synthesis and standard biological parts. David
Baker et al., Engineering Life: Building a FABforBiology, Sci. AM., June 20o6, at 44.
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hesitation about long-term research commitments."' Frequent modifications
of the tax credit would induce similar uncertainty. To counteract this worry,
tax policymakers should err on the side of caution, particularly with retractions
of the tax credit. Moreover, in mature industries-and in industries
where long-term research plans are the norm-patent may be the more
appropriate choice.
CONCLUSION
In this Note, I have compared patent and tax as innovation subsidies.
Admittedly, this project is far from complete. I focused primarily on the
comparative advantages of tax. I have argued that Congress would do well to
focus on tax subsidies in a variety of research situations:
* Where the research produces many discrete inventions;
* In diffuse research environments;
* Where administrative costs are on par with research costs;
* For solo inventors and small businesses;
* Where commercialization is slow; and
* In emerging industries.
There is much work left to be done in this line of research. The most important
next step will be to think carefully about how to deploy multiple innovation-
encouraging institutions together. Several aspects of the status quo already
reflect such a hybrid approach -for instance, the tax system treats a patent as
conclusive evidence that the research is technical in nature. In this Note, I have
suggested two other possibilities: first, a limited patent prosecution credit for
small businesses, which are most burdened by administrative costs; and,
second, a tax credit for patentees seeking to commercialize their inventions.
There is a more fundamental question, though, regarding the use of both
patent and tax to stimulate innovation: why should all research qualify for both
subsidies? At present there is no clear justification for why both subsidies
should always be necessary. Indeed, the policy and legal analysis in this Note
suggests a different baseline. The $10 billion that is distributed each year in
research tax subsidies should be more narrowly targeted. Tax subsidies should
218. See, e.g., GUENTHER, supra note 118, at 19.
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be prioritized for those researchers and industries where tax can most
effectively encourage optimal research decisionmaking. The list above
articulates the principles policymakers should use to find these industries,
several of which I have identified in this Note.
Alternatively, if narrow tailoring proves politically or practically difficult,
researchers could instead simply be forced to choose either a tax credit or a
patent." This would, in practice, delegate the job of tailoring to the researcher
herself: each researcher would have to decide which innovation subsidy is most
beneficial. If the inventor were to choose the tax credit, she could receive a
larger subsidy than she would have gotten had she not proved her invention
was worthy of a patent. Such a system would encourage researchers who
would not otherwise have bothered with the patent system to publicly disclose
their discovery. It would eliminate tax credits for businesses that expect to
make a large profit off the patent. And it would reduce the number of patents
issued. Of course, the devil is in the details -should the researcher have to
return the already-claimed credits on the research?-but such an either-or
approach may present a more sensible baseline than the status quo.
This Note has also hopefully illustrated the usefulness of a comparative
institutional approach. Legal academics too often assume that the best solution
to an inefficiency in, for example, the law of patents is to change the law of
patents. But sometimes the problem is that patent law is simply the wrong
institution, where a cheaper and more productive solution would be to use tax
(or prizes or grants). This is especially true in light of the deficiencies plaguing
the institution of patent law that I identified in Section II.D. Tax sometimes is
a second-best solution, but it may be the only solution that has a chance of
becoming a reality. When crafting policy, it is not enough to ask how best to
fix the problems of patent or tax. Policymakers should always also ask the prior
question: which institution is the best fit for the job?
86o
219. Allowing inventors to make a similar choice, between prizes and patents, has been shown to
be economically superior to a patent-only system. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 4,
at 530-31.
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